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The ability to export clothing products under preferences with liberal rules of origin is the key factor 
currently determining whether the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has a significant impact 
on non-oil exporting African countries. At present only a small number of countries receive substantial 
benefits and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) that do not receive preferences for clothing have yet to see 
an impact of AGOA on their overall exports. However, the benefits from exporting clothing under AGOA 
appear fragile in the face of the removal of quotas in the United States on major suppliers, such as China, at 
the end of 2004, and the planned removal of the liberal rules of origin that allow for the global sourcing of 
fabrics from least-cost locations. To entrench and enhance the benefits of AGOA, it is important that the 
scheme be extended over a much longer period, if not made permanent, and the special liberal rules of 
origin for clothing products be extended considerably beyond 2004. The effective inclusion of textile 
products and a number of high-duty agricultural products would also help to broaden the range of 
opportunities for African exporters in the U.S. market. Nevertheless it is important that the opportunities 
created by AGOA are integrated into a broader framework for promoting trade and that it be recognized 
that if the opportunities offered by more open trade are to be exploited there must be concerted efforts to 
improve the environment for investment in countries covered by AGOA. 
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This paper provides an initial assessment of the impact of the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) on trade and seeks to highlight the key stylized facts relating to 
this programme of trade preferences. It is clear that discussion of aggregate exports from 
African countries to the United States under AGOA is not very useful due to the 
preferences on oil and other energy products. In 2002 more than three-quarters of trade 
covered by AGOA was accounted for by two oil exporting countries, Gabon and Nigeria. 
Hence, the aim of this paper is to derive the magnitude of the benefits for individual 
beneficiaries. The paper shows that there is a wide variation in the value of the trade 
preferences across countries covered by AGOA. Deeper preferences for some countries 
than for others; more liberal rules of origin for some African suppliers than for others for 
key products, such as clothing; and differences in the structure of exports in tandem with 
variations across products in the size of external protection ensure that the impact of 
AGOA is not evenly distributed among Sub-Saharan African countries.  
 
The paper starts by describing the impact of AGOA in terms of the number of tariff lines 
liberalized, the overall amount of trade affected by these new preferences and those 
already existing under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), together with an 
analysis of the average duties on liberalized products. This shows that there are important 
differences between key groups of beneficiaries and in particular between those that have 
access to preferences on clothing products and those which do not. AGOA offers very 
little improvement in market access for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) that do not 
have preferences on clothing products.  
 
The paper then proceeds to look at the trade coverage of AGOA preferences and the 
utilization of those preferences, and provides a simple estimate of the economic value of 
the preferences for each AGOA beneficiary. This shows that currently most of the 
benefits go to very few of the countries. Preferences for clothing products lead to 
significant transfers to a small group of beneficiaries but for most countries the overall 
impact of AGOA preferences is at present likely to amount to no more than one-tenth of 
1 percent of GDP. This reflects that the value of preferential treatment amounts to a small   3
proportion of exports to the United States and that exports to the United States are 
typically a small fraction of total exports.  
 
Seven of the beneficiaries account for 96 percent of the estimated transfer under AGOA 
in 2002, with the remaining 31 beneficiaries receiving very little. However, it should be 
noted that the number of countries being granted preferences on clothing is increasing 
and that there may have been some very recent impacts of AGOA on certain countries 
that are not adequately captured in the available data. Nevertheless, maintaining and 
broadening the benefits of AGOA is a key issue, but something which is unlikely to be 
achieved if the current liberal rules of origin for clothing for least developed countries are 
replaced by much more restrictive requirements to use U.S. or regionally produced 
fabrics, as planned in October 2004.  
 
2. Summary of AGOA Provisions  
In this paper we concentrate on the trade provisions of AGOA, which are the key 
mechanisms for increasing the integration of the developing country beneficiaries into the 
global market. However, it is recognized that there are also other important provisions in 
AGOA which may have longer term indirect impacts on trade, for example, via enhanced 
domestic reform in AGOA countries, through increases in foreign direct investment by 
U.S. multinationals and through technical assistance to increase trade capacity. The key 
changes introduced by AGOA with regard to access to the U.S. market are as follows: 
  AGOA entrenches the current preferences available under the GSP by 
guaranteeing benefits until September 2008. The current GSP expires at the end of 
2006.  
  Elimination of the “competitive need limitation” of the GSP.
2 This is of benefit 
only to non-LDCs since LDCs are already excluded under the GSP.   
  The designation of a range of products normally excluded from GSP preferences 
as eligible for duty-free preferences under AGOA. As discussed below this is of 
most relevance to non-LDC countries since LDCs were already able to export the 
majority of these products duty-free under the GSP.  
                                                 
2 Under the GSP there are limitations in terms of both the share of total US imports and a fixed monetary 
value after which preferences for a particular country for that product are withdrawn.   4
o  For these products the standard rules of origin under the GSP are amended 
to allow 1) for cumulation across all AGOA beneficiaries in meeting the 
standard 35 percent value-added requirement. Under the GSP, cumulation 
is possible only between specified countries in particular regional 
groupings.
3 2) for the use of imported US inputs, up to a maximum of 15 
percent of the product’s value, to be counted towards the value-added 
requirement. 
o  However, it is very important to note that for agricultural products which 
are subject to tariff rate quotas, the duty exemption only applies to in- 
quota imports. Once the quota is exhausted, products from AGOA 
beneficiaries must pay the full MFN duty. As we shall show, how one 
interprets the treatment of these tariff quota products is crucial to the 
conclusions that are drawn concerning the extent to which liberalization 
under AGOA is comprehensive. 
  The removal of quotas on textile and clothing (apparel) products. In practice, 
however, only two countries, Mauritius and Kenya, were previously subject to 
quotas and only a subset of those on Mauritius could be considered as binding 
(Mattoo et al (2003)).
4 
  The granting of duty-free preferences to clothing products  
1.  Assembled from fabrics and yarns formed and cut in the United States 
2.  Assembled from fabrics formed in one or more of the AGOA beneficiaries 
from U.S. or regional yarns, subject to quantitative limits 
3.  Assembled in LDCs from any fabric or yarn.
5 This provision expires at the 
end of September 2004. 
                                                 
3 For example, under the GSP cumulation is possible between three members of SADC, Botswana, 
Mauritius and Tanzania. 
4 However, the imposition of the quotas may have contributed to the decline on the Kenyan industry during 
the 1990s, see Mwega and Muga (1999). 
5 The definition of an LDC with regard to the clothing provisions of AGOA differs from that which defines 
and LDC under the GSP. The GSP group is linked to the UN definition which includes an annual income 
per head of less than $900. The special rules of origin for clothing under AGOA are open to countries with 
an annual GNP per head of under $1500. There is also a degree of flexibility, since in the revision of 
AGOA in 2002, both Botswana and Namibia were redefined as LDCs for the purposes of AGOA.   5
Clothing assembled from non-U.S. fabrics (categories 2 and 3 above) is subject to 
quantitative restrictions with a limit of 4.23 percent of total U.S. imports of clothing in 
2003 rising to 7 percent in 2008. Within this there is a sub-limit on imports under the 
special rule of origin which allows for global sourcing of fabrics (category 3 above) of 
2.06 percent of total U.S. clothing imports. For the year October 2002 to end of 
September 2003 the overall quota was 36 percent filled. Within this the limit on products 
subject to liberal rules of origin was 62 percent utilized. Whilst the quota on products 
assembled from regional fabric was less than 10 percent filled. As we shall argue below 
these differences in utilization rates reflect in large part the differences in the 
restrictiveness of the rules of origin 
 
Access to preferences on clothing products is not automatic for AGOA beneficiaries. 
Countries must apply for these benefits and there are requirements regarding measures to 
prevent illegal transhipment including an effective visa system for clothing products. 
However, these requirements are unlikely to be a barrier to the granting of clothing 
preferences in many countries and technical assistance in meeting the requirements is 
available. 
 
3. Recent Export Performance and AGOA 
Ex-ante simulations of the impact of AGOA suggested very small gains to Sub-Saharan 
African countries as a group. Ianchovichina et al (2002) using a general equilibrium 
simulation model suggest an increase of 0.6 percent (or $192 million) in non-oil exports 
for Sub-Saharan African countries as a group from preferential access to the U.S. clothing 
market. Lederman and Ozden (2003), using a gravity model, find that in aggregate 
AGOA countries export between 20 to 40 percent more than excluded countries of 
similar economic and geographic characteristics. In practice exports from certain 
members of this group of countries have increased substantially while exports of others 
have not increased or stagnated. This reflects in part that to date only a subset of countries 
have been granted access to preferences on clothing products.   
   6
This is crudely shown in Table 1 which looks at recent trends in exports from key groups 
of AGOA beneficiaries to the United States and compares these recent changes with the 
increase in total exports. The choice of base year is fairly arbitrary although by going 
back to 1999 it does capture any changes immediately prior to the implementation of 
AGOA in anticipation of that policy change. A more detailed table with information for 
each country is provided in the Table in the Appendix. These tables show that, apart from 
the oil exporting countries, the United States is not currently a major destination for 
AGOA countries exports. For none of the non-oil exporting country groups does the 
share of the United States in total exports exceed 15 percent. The U.S. share of total 
exports exceeds 20 percent only for Madagascar and Swaziland together with the clear 
outlier, Lesotho, which sends 90 percent of total exports to the United States. 
Source: WITS 
 
Within the group of LDCs, exports to the United States from countries that have not been 
eligible for AGOA benefits on clothing products have fallen by 30% over the past four 
years while total exports of these countries have increased slightly. On the other hand, 
exports to the United States from LDCs with clothing benefits have increased by over 80 
percent,  much faster than their exports to the world. Similarly, amongst the non-LDCs, 
exports to the United States from those countries without clothing benefits has fallen, 
                                                 
6 A number of UN classified LDCs are not eligible for US GSP preferences. These include Liberia and 
Sudan. 
Table 1: The Importance of the U.S. as a Destination for AGOA Countries Exports 
and Trends in Exports over 1999-2002. 
  Share of U.S. in Total 
Exports: 2002 
Growth of Total 
Exports: 1999-2002 
Growth of Exports 
to U.S.: 1999-2002 
AGOA Countries      
    LDCs     
          Without apparel benefits  6.4%  2.6%  -30.2% 
          With apparel benefits  13.7%  19.5%  80.1% 
 
    Non-LDCs Oil Exporters  33.1% 25.1%  30.9% 
    Non-LDCs Non-Oil      
          Without apparel benefits  8.2%  15.4%  -16.8% 
          With apparel benefits       
               Liberal rules of origin  6.6%  21.5%  38.0% 
               Restrictive rules of origin  13.0%  11.1%  30.9% 
Other US GSP LDCs  33.5% 43.2%  41.4% 
Other UN LDCs
6  8.0% 86.6%  57.0%   7
whilst exports to the U.S. from countries eligible for clothing benefits have grown faster 
than total exports. Of course, these simple trends will reflect much more than the impact 
of AGOA and indeed there may be a degree of self-selection, with those countries with 
the lowest capacity to increase exports and the most challenging business environment 
being those which have not sought preferences on clothing products. 
 
It is also interesting to note that the other group of LDCs, which have not been granted 
access to AGOA benefits, have also increased their exports to the US substantially, by 
more than 40 percent, over the past 4 years.
7 These countries are on average much more 
dependent on the US market with over one-third of total exports going to the US. Strong 
growth in exports to the US is also a feature of the LDCs that are not eligible for GSP 
preferences in the US, although total exports have grown at a faster rate. Again, this 
suggests that not too much should be made of the impact of trade preferences. Such 
incentives may be exploited when domestic conditions are favourable but they are no 
means a panacea for export growth.  We now proceed to look in more detail at the 
importance of AGOA preferences across countries and the utilization of the available 
preferences. 
 
4. The Impact of AGOA 
4.1 The Extent of Liberalization under AGOA  
Here we provide a detailed look at the impact of AGOA in terms of the number of tariff 
lines liberalized by the Act and the amount of trade affected. It is important to remember 
that AGOA follows on from an existing scheme of preferences for developing countries 
under the GSP that was enhanced for the LDCs in 1997. As we shall show below this 
means that AGOA currently provides for very little additional liberalization for a number 




                                                 
7 This conclusion continues to apply if the oil exporters in this group, Angola and Equatorial Guinea, are 
excluded.   8
4.1.1 Agriculture 
Table 2 summarizes the effect of AGOA on agricultural products. At present the 
economies and the exports of most of the AGOA countries are dominated by the 
agricultural sector. Hence, what happens in agriculture is of crucial importance. 
Unfortunately, the nature of the US tariff schedule means that simple assessments of 
tariff liberalization under AGOA are not possible, with different interpretations of the 
way that certain products are treated being possible, which can lead to conflicting 
conclusions about the extent of overall AGOA liberalization. We focus on the extent to 
which all products in the tariff schedule are fully liberalized and conclude that a 
significant number of products remain effectively excluded from AGOA preferences. 
This differs from the approach of the office of the US Trade Representative who 
concentrate on the extent to which products currently exported from Sub-Saharan African 
countries to the US are liberalized under AGOA which leads to the conclusion that 
“substantially all imports from Sub-Saharan Africa are eligible to enter the United States 
duty free” (USTR (2003)).   
 
When looking at the US tariff schedule we first note that there are a number of lines that 
are shown as AGOA products which are likely to be economically meaningless. These 
are lines which refer to General Note 15 of the US tariff schedule, which provides for 
products that are subject to tariff rate quotas and to safeguards and that are imported by 
the US government, individuals in quantities of less than 5 kilograms, or imported as 
samples, for exhibitions or for display at trade fairs not to count against the in quota 
quantity for that product. If such products are imported from AGOA countries then they 
are eligible for zero duty access and do not count against the quantitative limit for that 
product. In the 2002 tariff schedule 85 agricultural lines designated as AGOA products 
referred to General Note 15. This amounted to 14 percent of the total number of AGOA 
designated agricultural tariff lines. Imports from AGOA countries were recorded in only 
one of these categories in 2002 and in this case the amount was negligible. For an 
accurate representation of the impact of AGOA we think these lines should be excluded 
from the analysis.  
   9
The key issue is that in the US tariff schedule there are a number of agricultural products 
which are subject to tariff rate quotas. As described in more detail in Box 1 the way that 
these products are treated is important in determining the conclusions that are drawn 
concerning the liberalization of agricultural products under AGOA. Our approach leads 

































Table 2 shows that the impact of AGOA in agriculture differs substantially between the 
LDCs and the non-LDCs. For the LDCs, AGOA liberalizes only an additional 26 
agricultural tariff lines, equivalent in number to less than 2 percent of the total number of 
agricultural lines and just under 12 percent of the remaining dutiable lines. In the main 
Box 1: The Treatment of Agricultural Products Subject to Tariff Rate Quotas 
 
Products which are subject to tariff rate quotas have different tariff lines and
different tariff rates for imports within the specified quantity and for imports in excess of
this amount. AGOA preferences are only available for the in-quota quantities. Once the
quota is exceeded then the full (usually very high) MFN duty is applicable. This leads us
to conclude that the preferences on tariff quota products may not be effective and may
have little economic value. For these reasons we analyze tariff lines and treat the out of
quota tariff lines as being excluded from AGOA preferences. Indeed these lines are not
designated as eligible under AGOA.  
An alternative approach is to assume that if there are preferences on in quota
quantities and the quota is not exceeded then the out of quota duties are not relevant. Of
course, if these duties are not relevant it is very difficult to understand why these products
have not been fully liberalized and the AGOA countries offered quota and duty free access
to the US. It is important whether the quota is global (an amount which can be satisfied by
any country) or bilateral, in which  a limit is specified for a particular country or
countries. Most of the quotas specify only a global quota. In 2002, imports from AGOA
countries were recorded in only 7 of the 158 tariff quota products. The key sector here is
sugar where 7 countries exported under bilateral quotas to the US in 2002. These
preferences on raw sugar are however covered by the GSP. The key tariff rate quota
product for which in quota quantities were liberalized under AGOA is tobacco for
cigarettes, with Malawi being the main exporter in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The fact that AGOA countries are not exporting most of the products subject to
tariff quotas does not mean that these quotas are unimportant. Indeed these quotas could
be an important factor constraining the impact of AGOA. The out of quota duties are
typically very high. For products with bilateral limits the available quantity may not be
sufficient to warrant investment in raising capacity. For products subject to a global quota,
uncertainty concerning when the quota will be filled may deter any investment or indeed
any attempt to commence exporting. For these reasons we think it important to reflect that
AGOA does not liberalise these out of quota duties.   10
the products liberalized under AGOA are those that have already been liberalized for 
LDCs under the provisions of the GSP.  For non-LDCs, AGOA adds 541 products to the 
519 products already eligible for duty-free preferences for developing countries under the 
GSP. Hence, the potential impact on the non-LDCs is much greater. 
 
The numbers in brackets show the number of product lines relating to in-quota duty rates for products 
subject to TRQs. 
 
Table 2 also shows that in 2002 of the 541 agricultural products liberalized under AGOA 
120 were subject to tariff quotas. A further 38 product lines under the GSP were subject 
to tariff quotas. For the LDCs, all of these product lines had previously been covered by  
the GSP. In Table 2 we show that there are over 200 agricultural tariff lines with no 
preference under AGOA. These amount to 17 percent of the total number of dutiable 
agricultural tariff lines in the US schedule. Of these lines more than 150 relate to the over 
quota rates for products subject to tariff rate quotas. The products which have not been 
fully liberalized include certain meat products, a large number of dairy products, many 
sugar products, chocolate, a large range of prepared food products, certain tobacco 
products and groundnuts, that latter being of particular importance to a number of African 
countries.




                                                 
8 The tariff quota on groundnuts is very small, with Argentina allowed to export 44 thousand tons and all 
other countries 9 thousand tons. The out of quota tariff on unshelled groundnuts is 163.8 percent whilst that 
on shelled groundnuts is 131.8 percent. 
Table 2: Liberalization of Agricultural Products under AGOA  – The Number of Tariff Lines Liberalized  
   Non-LDCs LDCs 
Total Tariff Lines  1723 1723 
Total GSP   519   1038 
     GSP   519 (38)   547 (158)  
     GSP LDC   … 491 
GSP LDC but  not  AGOA  … 4 
AGOA  541 (120)  26 
Duty-Free Lines  440 440 
Lines Excluded from AGOA   223 219 
Main sectors containing products 




With regard to manufacturing, see Table 3, AGOA liberalises 1,249 tariff lines for non-
LDCs on top of the 3,116 lines given duty free preferences under the GSP. These 
additional preferences amount to 14 percent of the total number of manufacturing lines. 
Again, the impact for LDCs is more limited due to the prior liberalization of many lines 
under the GSP. AGOA liberalises an additional 199 lines compared to the 4,223 lines 
already liberalized under the GSP. The third and fourth columns of the table show the 
importance of the liberalization of clothing products under AGOA which adds an 
additional 557 tariff lines. This creates a significant difference in the benefits available to 
Sub-Saharan African LDCs under AGOA. 
 
Data source: USITC dataweb 
 
For manufactures, about 16 percent of the dutiable lines are excluded from preferences 
for the countries that receive clothing benefits, while for those countries that have not 
been granted the clothing benefits duties must be paid on 25 percent of the dutiable lines 
in the US tariff schedule. The key products excluded from tariff preferences are textile 
                                                 
9 It is important to note that cotton (which is part of chapter 52) is treated as an agricultural product by the 
WTO but is included under manufacturing in this paper. Raw cotton is subject to a tariff rate quota and 
safeguard measures in the US. This means that in chapter 52 there is a ‘General Note 15 product’. In fact 
there is a special clause in general note 15 such that imports of upland cotton do not count against the tariff 
quota, but this is irrelevant to the main cotton producers in Africa. Here again we believe that inclusion of 
this tariff line as an AGOA product is misleading so we exclude it.   
Table 3: Liberalization of Manufacturing Products under AGOA  – The Number of Tariff Lines Liberalized  
  Without apparel benefits  With apparel benefits 
   Non-LDC  LDC  Non-LDC  LDC 
Total Lines  8660 8660  8660  8660 
Total GSP   3116 4223  3116  4223 
     GSP   3116 3116  3116  3116 
     GSP LDC   … 1107  …  1107 
GSP LDC but  not  AGOA  … 57  …  57 
AGOA  1249 199  1806  756 
     Clothing (HS61, 62)
  … …  557  557 
Duty-Free   2773 2773  2773  2775 
Lines Excluded from AGOA   1522 1465  965  911 
Main sectors containing products 
excluded from Preferences   Leather products, Textile and textile articles, Headgear, Glass and glassware    12
products,
10 certain glass products and certain headwear.
11 The average duty on textiles is 
over 8 percent and the duty on certain textile products reaches almost 30 percent. 
 
In terms of its impact on total trade, AGOA adds 1790 lines of preferences to the 3,635 
lines already liberalized under the GSP for non-LDCs.
12 With eligibility for clothing 
preferences adding a further 557 lines. For the LDCs which are not eligible for clothing 
benefits only an additional 225 lines are liberalized under AGOA. For the LDCs without 
clothing benefits 23 percent of dutiable lines remain excluded from preferences, whilst 
for non-LDCs with clothing benefits 16 percent of dutiable lines remain without 
preferences.  
 
So, in terms of the number of tariff lines liberalized the principal impact of AGOA falls 
on the non-LDC Sub-Saharan African countries. This reflects that, with the exception of 
clothing, most of the products liberalized under AGOA had already been liberalized 
under the GSP for the LDCs. For the LDCs what matters is whether they are able to 
access the preferences on clothing products. We shall also discuss below that a key factor 
determining the ability of LDCs to exploit the preferences on clothing are the rules of 
origin. Current liberal rules of origin for many countries have helped to stimulate exports. 
However, much more restrictive rules of origin will be imposed in 2004 which will 
seriously constrain the ability of LDCs to benefit from AGOA. 
 
 
                                                 
10 AGOA does provide preferences for specific textile items which are hand loomed, handmade or a 
folklore article of a beneficiary country, but in practice this has had no impact on trade. No imports into the 
US have been recorded of such products. A number of countries have been approved to export such 
products but the impact on trade will be minor. 
11 Although there is a quota on exports of clothing under AGOA we do not add the out of quota rates to the 
group of lines excluded from preferences, as we did for the agricultural products subject to TRQs, for a 
number of reasons. First, the clothing quota is not specific to particular tariff lines but covers all clothing 
products. Second, the quota is applied to AGOA countries, whereas most of the agricultural TRQs have 
global quotas so that the quota can be filled by any country or countries. Finally, the clothing quota is 
specified as a (growing) share of (the expanding) value of total US imports of clothing rather than a more 
narrow and restrictive quantitative limit.  
12 Many publications which discuss AGOA, see USTR (2003) for example, suggest that the GSP covers 
4650 lines. This is a very dated figure and does not capture that for a large number of tariff lines duties 
have been subsequently reduced to zero under the commitments entered into under the Uruguay Round and 
therefore there are now no GSP preferences. We also exclude the General Note 15 products.   13
4.2 The Amount of Trade Affected 
Tables 4a and 4b show separately for LDCs and non-LDCs the amount of trade in 2002 
that entered the U.S. market with GSP or AGOA preferences as well as trade in zero duty 
products and exports on which the full MFN duty is paid. The table shows that in 2002 
LDCs without clothing benefits did not export any products under AGOA. This reflects 
that AGOA led to very little additional market opening for these countries relative to the 
preferences already available under the GSP. It is worth noting that these countries are 
currently not exporting to the U.S. products that are excluded from preferences.  
 
Data source: USITC dataweb 
Note: The classification of countries in the table is that pertaining in 2002, to allow for a match with the 
available trade data. It should be noted that subsequently the Central African Republic has been  removed 
whilst Angola has been added to the list of AGOA eligible countries.  Benin (2004), Mali, Niger, and 
Rwanda (2003) have also become eligible for apparel benefits since 2002.   
 
In terms of development the key sectors here are the agricultural products subject to tariff 
rate quotas, textiles and clothing. Preferences on clothing products are available under 
AGOA. Thus, key issues for these countries are whether to take the necessary steps to 
request eligibility for clothing preferences and to consider how to improve the domestic 
investment climate to allow firms to better take advantage of existing opportunities 
created by AGOA and new opportunities for diversification that would arise with 
preferences for clothing. For these countries AGOA will be of value if in the future it 
provides for the export of a greater range of products. 
Table 4a: Value of LDCs Exports to the U.S. under AGOA in 2002 ($mill)  
  LDCs without apparel 
benefits 
LDCs with apparel benefits
Total Value of Exports to US   280  683 
Value for Exports Requesting Preferences   146  454 
     GSP   146  17 
     Total AGOA  0  437 
          AGOA apparel  0  406 
Exports for which MFN rate is zero  122  198 
Exports of products excluded from Preferences   1  0 
Exports Eligible for Preferences but Preferences not Requested  11  30 
Countries  Benin, Central African Rep., 
Chad, Dem. Congo, Djibouti, 
Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Rwanda, Sao 
Tome&Prin., Sierra Leone 
Cape Verde, Ethiopia, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mozambique, 
Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia  14
 
For those LDCs that are eligible for clothing benefits a substantial proportion of exports 
to the United States request preferences, about two-thirds in 2002, and most of those 
preferences are for clothing products under AGOA. In fact 90 percent of products from 
these countries requesting preferential access to the United States in 2002 were clothing 
products. It is worth remembering that all of these countries are able to export clothing to 
the United States with the liberal rule of origin that allows for the global sourcing of 
fabrics. Products covered by the GSP are not important in the exports of these countries 
whilst 30 percent of the exports of these countries to the U.S. are products for which the 
MFN duty is zero. 
Data source: USITC dataweb  
Note: Since 2002 Eritrea has been removed from the list of AGOA beneficiaries and Cote d’Ivore has 
become eligible for apparel benefits. 
 
Table 4b for the non-LDCs again distinguishes between those countries that are eligible 
to export clothing under preferences and from those that are not. The table first shows 
that for those countries not eligible for clothing benefits, AGOA preferences still affect a 
substantial proportion of trade – $6.6 billion out of total exports to the U.S. of $8 billion. 
However, the table then shows that almost all of this amount is accounted for by two oil 
exporting countries, Gabon and especially Nigeria. The next column of the table shows 
that for the non-oil exporters of this group, products exported to the U.S. under AGOA 
Table 4b: Value of Non-LDCs Exports to the U.S. under AGOA in 2002 ($mill)   
  Non-LDCs without apparel 
benefits 
Non-LDCs with apparel benefits 




Total Value of Exports   8050  627  666  4426 
Value for Exports Requesting Preferences   6712  156  368  1465 
     GSP   26  25 25 561 
     Total AGOA  6686  131  342  896 
          AGOA Apparel  0  0  201  192 
Exports for which MFN rate is zero  519  344  233  2532 
Exports of products excluded from Preferences   1  0  2  102 
Exports Eligible for Preferences but Preferences 
not Requested 
819 127  63  326 
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accounted for only about 21 percent of total exports, whilst 54 percent of exports were 
those for which the MFN duty is zero and there are no preferences.  
 
The value of products for which the MFN duty is positive but there are no preferences is 
currently very small for this group. However, it is interesting that 20 percent of total 
exports of this group to the US are products eligible for preferences but do not request 
those preferences. This  means that the utilization rate of available preferences is only 55 
percent. A probable reason for this low uptake of preferences is that the costs of 
satisfying the origin rules and/or the costs of proving conformity with those rules 
outweigh the value of the available preferences. 
 
Table 4b then shows the amount of exports from non-LDCs eligible for preferences on 
clothing products that enter the US under AGOA. We further distinguish between those 
countries which have been granted liberal rules of origin until 2004 and the two countries 
which are eligible for clothing preferences but which have to satisfy much more 
restrictive rules of origin, Mauritius and South Africa. For the first group of countries 
with the liberal rules of origin AGOA has clearly had a substantial impact in aggregate. 
Products covered by GSP preferences are of little importance to these countries 
accounting for only 3.8 percent of total exports to the US in 2002. On the other hand, 
products covered by AGOA preferences, including those on clothing, accounted for over 
51 percent of exports to the US and 80 percent of exports to which MFN duties are 
applicable. Almost 60 percent of exports from these countries requesting preferences 
under AGOA are clothing products, highlighting the importance of these products and the 
potential significance of the rules of origin. Just over one-third of the exports to the US of 
this group of countries are products for which the MFN duty is zero. A negligible amount  
of current exports are of products for which there are no preferences. More important are 
products which although eligible for preferences do not request preferential access to the 
US. These exports which forego preferences accounted for 10 percent of total exports to 
the US in 2002.  
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Taking South Africa and Mauritius together, more than 57 percent of their exports to the 
United States are products for which the MFN rate is zero. GSP products account for 
about 13 percent of total exports to the U.S. while exports under AGOA comprise 20 
percent of the total. However, in contrast to the previous group of countries, clothing 
products do not dominate exports under AGOA accounting for only 21 percent of AGOA 
exports. This reflects the much broader industrial base of South Africa and the ability to 
exploit preferences on products such as cars. There is also a degree of under-utilization of 
preferences with almost 19 percent of exports eligible for preferences not requesting 
these benefits. Again this raises the issue of the rules of origin for clothing products to 
which we return later. 
 
4.3 Average Duties on AGOA Covered and Excluded Products 
Table 5a, for agricultural products, and 5b for manufacturing, provide a very simple look 
at the average MFN duties that apply to each of the preferential groups of products. The 
numbers presented are simple unweighted averages of duties applied in 2003. This 
provides a crude view of the margins of preference available in the US. The tables show 
that AGOA covers products with higher duties than those covered by the GSP. For 
example, the average duty on agricultural products covered by the GSP for non-LDCs is 
3.5 percent whilst the average duty on the additional products for which preferences are 
available for LDCs is 6.9 percent
13, which is similar to the average duty on products 
liberalized under AGOA. For manufactures, the average duty on products covered by the 
GSP is 3.8 percent, whilst the products covered by the basic AGOA provisions are 
subject to an average duty of 6.1 percent and the clothing products on average pay a duty 
of more than 12 percent. 
                                                 
13 As discussed earlier we only include the in quota duty rates for the TRQ products in the calculation of the 
average MFN duty on AGOA products. We then put the out of quota rates in the calculation of the average 
duties on lines not covered by AGOA   17
For specific tariffs data on 2002 calculated duties and customs value (based on 2002 US GSP Group) are 
used to derive ad valorem equivalents.  When there are zero duties for the GSP group of countries we use 
data for total imports to calculate the ad valorem equivalent.   
Data source: USITC dataweb 
 
These tables also show that the products excluded from preferences are high-duty 
products. For agriculture the average duty on excluded products is over 30 percent, these 
include the out of quota duty rates for products affected by tariff rate quotas. This, at least 
in part, might explain why there may be so few exports of these products from Sub-
Saharan African countries to the US, as shown in Table 2. Similarly for manufactures the 
average duty on products not eligible for preferences is high relative to the overall 
average duty and high relative to the products covered by the GSP. Hence, in terms of the 
average margin of preference, AGOA significantly enhances the preferences available to 
Sub-Saharan African countries, particularly for those countries eligible to receive benefits 
for clothing products. Nevertheless, a range of high average duty products, particularly in 
agriculture, remain excluded from preferences.  
Table 5a: Unweighted Average Tariffs for Agriculture Tariff Lines under AGOA and GSP, and for 
those excluded from Preferences in 2003 
  Non-LDCs LDCs 
Total GSP   3.5% 5.2% 
     GSP   3.5% 3.5% 
     GSP LDC   … 6.8% 
Total AGOA  6.7% 7.7% 
    
Dutiable Lines – Products excluded from AGOA   30.7% 31.0% 
Table 5b: Unweighted Average Tariffs for Manufactured Products Under AGOA and GSP, and for 
those excluded from Preferences in 2003 
  Without apparel benefits  With apparel benefits 
 Non-LDCs  LDCs  Non-LDCs  LDCs 
Total GSP   3.8% 4.0%  3.8%  4.0% 
     GSP   3.8% 3.8%  3.8%  3.8% 
     GSP LDC   … 4.8%  …  4.8% 
Total AGOA  6.1% 12.7%  7.7%  12.3% 
     AGOA (excluding GSP)  6.1% 12.7%  6.1%  12.7% 
     AGOA apparel
  … …  12.1%  12.1% 
Dutiable Lines – Products excluded 
from AGOA  
9.9% 10.2%  8.7%  9.1%   18
 
5. The Magnitude and Importance of Preferences under AGOA 
The importance of US trade preferences varies immensely across African countries. For 
certain countries AGOA (including GSP preferences) is of little or no relevance under the 
current structure of exports since there are no or few exports of products eligible for 
preferences, that is that are legally eligible to enter the U.S. market with lower duties than 
other non-preferred suppliers. Figure 1 shows that there are nine AGOA beneficiaries for 
whom less than 5 percent of current exports are eligible for preferential access to the US. 
In part this reflects that these countries are producing and exporting products for which 
the MFN duty in the U.S. is zero. In this case it follows that benefits may flow from 
AGOA only if these preferences encourage and permit diversification into a broader 
range of exports. Most of the 9 countries are only eligible at present for basic AGOA 
preferences. Uganda and Zambia are exceptions in that they have been granted eligibility 
for clothing preferences, although, by 2002 this had not been reflected in substantial 
exports of such products to the United States. However, the data that are available for 
2003 suggest that the preferences on clothing for Uganda which were granted from 
October 2001 are having an effect with exports of clothing to the United States rising 
from $0 in 2002 to $819,000 in the first 8 months of 2003.
14  
 
Figure 1 then shows a further 14 countries, including South Africa, for whom the amount 
of exports eligible for preferential access to the U.S. market comprises less than 50 
percent of total exports to that market. There are then 16 countries for whom AGOA 
preferences are more significant, with exports eligible for preferences amounting to more 
than 50 percent of the total. Within this group there are five countries for whom more 
than 90 percent of their current exports to the United States are eligible for preferences. 
Here it is interesting to look at Lesotho, where all exports to the U.S. are eligible for 
preferences, whereas in contrast only 28 percent of exports to the European Union in 
2001 were eligible for preferences. In this case exports to the United States amounted to 
$321 million whilst exports to the European Union were only 14 million euro. This 
                                                 
14 See New York Times, 14 November 2003, concerning the job creating impact in Uganda of AGOA 
preferences on clothing products. (http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/14/international/africa/14AFRI.html)   19
reflects the very large amounts of clothing exported to the U.S. duty and quota free, at 
present, under liberal rules of origin. There is duty free access to the European Union for 
Lesotho but there are much more restrictive rules of origin.  
 
Nigeria and Gabon are different cases. For these countries the value of exports to the 
European Union and the United States are broadly similar yet exports eligible for 
preferences in the E.U. are small whilst most of exports to the U.S. can enjoy preferential 
access. This reflects the different treatment of mineral fuels, the dominant export for 
these two countries, for which the E.U. MFN duty rate is zero whilst it is positive in the 
U.S. 
 
Table 6 shows for all countries covered by AGOA the share of exports to the US which 
were legally eligible for preferences and the share of exports to the EU legally eligible for 
preferences. Interestingly there is a very low correlation between these two series (15 
percent). Thus, it is apparent that for many developing countries the products that they 
currently export are often subject to different degrees of preference in different OECD 
markets. This reflects that: 
  Preferences are available for a given product in one market, where there is a 
positive MFN duty, but not in another, where the MFN rate is zero.  
  MFN rates are positive in all OECD markets but the product may be eligible for 
preferences in one market but excluded from preferences in another.  
  Products are eligible for preferences in all markets but the margin of preference 
often varies across those markets due to differences in MFN rates and due to the 
size of the preference that is granted.  
  Finally, the rules of origin for a given product differ across preferential schemes.  
 
This all implies difficulties for firms in developing countries in investing and developing 
capacity on the basis of serving a global market. The impact of preferences in developed 
countries would be enhanced by greater coordination and harmonization of rules of 
origin.  Hence the segmented nature of preferential access to developed country markets   20
limits the value of those preferences as a mechanism for integrating developing countries 
into the world economy. 
 
6. Current Utilization of AGOA Preferences 
The economic impact of available preferences depends on the magnitude of those 
preferences and the extent to which they are actually utilized. The magnitude of the 
preferences depends on the size of the MFN tariff, while the utilization rate will be 
Table 6: Share of Exports Eligible for Preferences in the E.U. (2001) and the U.S. (2002) 
   U.S.  E.U. 
Benin   0  33.9 
Guinea-Bissau 0  41.5 
Seychelles 0.3  86.2 
Guinea 0.5  11.7 
Chad 0.7  2.5 
Uganda 1.2  52.7 
Zambia   2.1  40.2 
Rwanda   2.2  15.8 
Sao Tome and Principe  3.8  33.1 
Ethiopia 10.7  30.4 
Tanzania   11.0  48.1 
Central African Rep.  12.3  0.4 
Namibia 14.0  50.7 
Níger 17.0  2.5 
Djibouti   18.0  6.7 
Mali 19.3  18.0 
Sierra Leone  23.0  21.9 
Cote d'Ivore   25.5  37.1 
Botswana 27.4  9.1 
Senegal 28.3  71.7 
Ghana 33.6  44.2 
South Africa   36.8   
Madagascar 43.6  82.3 
Eritrea 55.0  46.3 
Mauritania   63.5  33.5 
Gambia 64.0  46.0 
Mozambique 74.4  90.0 
Kenya 76.3  52.6 
Dem. Congo   81.3  3.9 
Cameroon 82.3  20.5 
Malawi 82.8  83.3 
Rep. Congo  83.2   
Swaziland 85.8  25.0 
Mauritius 94.5  66.6 
Gabon   94.9  6.2 
Cape Verde  97.7  79.5 
Nigeria   98.4  4.6 
Lesotho 100.0  27.9   21
influenced by this margin of preference as well as the rules governing access to those 
preferences, especially the rules of origin. Figure 2 shows a wide variation in the 
utilization of AGOA and GSP preferences across countries. The rate of utilization is 
defined as the share of exports requesting preferences relative to the amount of exports 
eligible for preferences. 
 
The average rate of utilization for AGOA eligible countries in 2002 was over 80 percent. 
This is high relative to the utilization of GSP schemes and is comparable to the utilization 
rate of E.U. preferences for these countries under the Cotonou agreement. There is little 
difference in the average utilization rate once oil exporting countries are excluded. 
Nevertheless there are sixteen countries that utilise less than 50 percent of the available 
preferences. A key issue for the future is that at present many of the countries which are 
eligible for clothing preferences are able to export to the United States under very liberal 
rules of origin. This provision is due to expire in 2004 and given the experience of other 
preferential schemes with the more restrictive rules of origin that will be imposed from 
late 2004 it is certain that the utilization rates for many of these countries will fall.  
 
Mauritius and South Africa are the only two countries that are eligible for clothing 
preferences but which have not been granted liberal rules of origin. In 2002, 90 percent of 
exports from Mauritius to the U.S. were clothing products, yet only 41 percent of the 
available preferences for these products were taken up. Clothing only accounts for about 
4 percent of South African exports to the U.S. although the absolute amount is similar to 
that exported by Mauritius. In 2002 only 47 percent of the available preferences for South 
African clothing products were actually utilized. The issue with the more restrictive rules 
of origin is not just the constraints that these rules impose on the sourcing of inputs, 
forcing producers to use higher cost fabrics and materials, but also the costs and 
difficulties in proving conformity with these rules compared to the more liberal rules 
where fabrics can be globally sourced. 
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7. The Value of Preferences 
Previously we have looked at the importance of products subject to preferences in each 
country’s total exports to the United States. The current economic value of these 
preferences will be determined by the amount of preferential trade and the margin of 
preference that is granted. Figure 3 shows the estimated value of preferences requested in 
2002 as a proportion of total exports to the United States for each country grouped 
according to the preferential treatment that they receive. This shows the tariff payment 
that is foregone by the U.S. due to the preferences that each country is able to request.
15 
In what follows we implicitly assume that this amount of tariff revenue avoided is 
captured by the exporter in the African country, although in practice these rents may 
accrue to importers in the United States. Indeed, Ozden and Olarreaga (2003), suggest 
that two-thirds of the transfer under AGOA may actually go to U.S. importers.  
 
The left-hand section of Figure 3 shows that for AGOA beneficiaries that are not eligible 
for preferences on clothing the value of U.S. preferences under current trade structures is 
very small. For none of the countries in this group does the value of preferences exceed 1 
percent of the value of exports to the United States. For 13 of these countries the value of 
preferences is less than 0.25 percent of the value of exports to the United States. Thus, the 
preferences available to these countries under AGOA and the GSP are having little 
apparent economic impact at present.  
 
The value of preferences are more substantial and more widespread for countries in the  
second group of AGOA beneficiaries; those which are eligible for duty-free access for 
clothing products. In this group there are 10 countries for which the value of current 
preferences in the United States exceeds 1 percent of the value of exports to the U.S. 
                                                 
15 This is derived by multiplying the value of exports to the US requesting preferences by the preferential 
margin, the MFN tariff for each product, at the tariff line level. For agricultural products which are subject 
to tariff quotas we apply the out-of-quota duty rate. However, for certain products subject to what are called 
technical duties (comprising a duty related to the unreported content of the product, such as the sugar 
content) the value of preferences is obtained using duties calculated by USITC for AGOA countries in total 
(or when not available for all exporters) to derive an ad valorem equivalent tax. This means that for 
products subject to tariff quotas the average within and out of quota duty is used as the margin of 
preference. In practice these technical duties affected only 8 tariff codes of products currently exported by 
AGOA countries and do not have a significant impact on the results presented here.       23
However, for most of these countries the share of the United States in total exports is 
relatively small (see Appendix Table 1). This means that the current aggregate impact of 
these preferences on the economies of the beneficiaries will be slight. For example, the 
value of U.S. preferences for Malawi is estimated to be equal to 10 percent of the value of 
exports to the U.S., yet this is equivalent to just 1.6 percent of the total value of Malawi’s 
exports and around 0.44 percent of GDP. The clear exception is Lesotho for whom the 
value of U.S. preferences amounts to 19 percent of the value of exports and, given the 
importance of the U.S. market for Lesotho, to more than 17 percent of the value of total 
exports and to approximately 6 percent of GDP in 2002. 
 
Figure 4 takes this analysis a little further by showing the absolute value in millions of 
dollars of the implicit transfers due to U.S. preferences. We start by noting that for the 
first group of AGOA beneficiaries there are substantial transfers only to the oil exporters, 
Gabon and Nigeria. Most of the benefits go to one country, Nigeria, or to those in the 
United States importing from Nigeria. In 2002 the preferences accorded to Nigeria led to 
a potential transfer of over $20 million. This transfer for Nigeria amounted to almost 10 
percent of the total value of preferences for all countries under AGOA.  
 
Figure 4 shows that in absolute terms Lesotho receives the biggest benefits under   
AGOA. The estimated transfer in 2002 being $61 million, which represents 28 percent of 
the total calculated value of all AGOA preferences.  The only other substantial transfers 
under AGOA at present go to Malawi, Madagascar, Swaziland, Mauritius, Kenya and 
South Africa. All of these countries are eligible for preferences on clothing products, 
although Mauritius and South Africa have not been granted use of the liberal rule of 
origin. These countries account for 86 percent of the total benefits derived by AGOA 
countries in 2002.  For Lesotho, Madagascar, Swaziland, Mauritius and Kenya, 99 
percent or more of the benefits of preferential access to the United States come from 
clothing. Thus, for these countries at present the ability to export clothing to the U.S. 
under preferences is the key to deriving benefits under AGOA. This will be a main factor 
affecting the ability of other countries to derive benefits from AGOA in the future.  
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So for non-oil exporting countries that are not eligible for preferences on clothing 
products the transfer under AGOA never exceeds $1 million and the benefits amount to 
less than 1 percent of the value of exports to the US. Given the small share of the United 
States in the overall exports of most of these countries, typically less than 10 percent, the 
broader macroeconomic impact of preferences will be negligible. Crudely assuming 
exports to be 100 percent of GDP would lead to such preferences being equivalent to 0.1 
percent of GDP. The key issue for many of these countries is the strengthening of supply 
capacities and diversification to facilitate the growth of total exports. Preferences can 
play a role in encouraging these changes but they should be treated as part of a strategy 
toward creating a broad base for export expansion. 
 
The Integrated Framework (IF) for Trade Related Technical Assistance, when 
incorporated into poverty reduction strategies, provides a vehicle for addressing these 
issues, defining appropriate policy responses and mobilizing relevant resources. In this 
case it is necessary for both the United States and the international institutions to 
reconsider carefully eligibility for AGOA and the IF. There are a number of United 
Nations defined LDCs that are eligible for the IF but are not included under AGOA. 
There are also a number of non-LDCs that are eligible for AGOA but not the IF who may 
well benefit from an IF process. 
 
A key factor driving the growth of clothing exports, the key source of benefits under 
AGOA, has been the liberal rules of origin. It is currently proposed that these will be 
removed during 2004 and replaced by much more restrictive rules requiring the use of 
regionally sourced or U.S. fabrics. This will reduce the value of the available preferences 
as producers in Africa will have to shift to higher-cost sources of fabrics. Hence, it is 
most likely that the value of preferences calculated here will decline once the more 
restrictive rules of origin are enforced and the incentives to other countries to diversify 
into clothing will diminish. The quantity constraints on other key suppliers of clothing 
under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing are also likely to have encouraged some of 
the investment in clothing in Africa. As we will argue below, making the rules of origin 
more restrictive will make it much more difficult for African suppliers to compete in the   25
U.S. market next year after the quotas have been removed, as is mandated by the 
agreement. 
 
8. The Issue of Rules of Origin 
The granting of clothing benefits is dependent on the country operating an effective visa 
system, which is a “government-industry process that demonstrates that the goods for 
which benefits are claimed were in fact produced in a Sub-Saharan Africa country”.
16 
Each shipment is accompanied by an original visa stamped on the original invoice. In 
addition, US Customs is permitted to visit factories, producers and exporters for 
verification purposes and AGOA countries must provide monthly export data to allow for 
reconciliation with US import statistics. This highlights that it is these mechanisms which 
are present to prevent shipments of clothing products from other countries illegally 
claiming reduced duties under AGOA through false declaration.  
 
Contrary to some beliefs it is not the role of the rules of origin to prevent illegal activity 
but rather to prevent legal transhipment whereby in the absence of rules of origin 
products produced in other countries are shipped to beneficiaries where they are subject 
to only minimal processing and then exported on to the preference granting market. In the 
case of AGOA the issue is whether assembly of imported fabrics into finished clothing, 
as is allowed for by the rules of origin currently applied to most beneficiaries of AGOA 
clothing provisions, is a sufficient process to enable African countries to derive 
substantial benefits from preferences. This rule entails that clothing producers in Africa 
can freely choose where to source their fabrics.  
 
The converse issue is whether more restrictive rules of origin would increase or decrease 
the benefits of AGOA to African countries. This is highly relevant since after October 
2004 clothing from African countries will only receive preferences if the fabric is 
regionally produced or bought from the US. This requires that a much higher degree of 
processing must be carried out in the combined AGOA-US area but will reduce the 
                                                 
16 Africa Growth and Opportunity Act Implementation Guide, October 2000, USTR.   26
competitiveness of African producers in the US market since they will have to source 
fabrics from a subset of higher-cost suppliers.    
 
Strict rules of origin are viewed by some as a mechanism for encouraging the 
development of integrated production structures within developing countries to maximize 
the impact on employment and to ensure that it is not just low value-added activities that 
are undertaken in the developing countries. However, there is no evidence that strict rules 
of origin over the past 30 years have done anything to stimulate the development of 
integrated production structures in developing countries.  In fact such arguments have 
become redundant in the light of technological changes and global trade liberalization 
that have led to the fragmentation of production processes and the development of global 
networks of sourcing.   
 
Strict rules of origin act to constrain the ability of firms to integrate into these global and 
regional production networks and in effect act to dampen the location of any value-added 
activities.  In the modern world economy, flexibility in the sourcing of inputs is a key 
element in international competitiveness.  In the clothing industry, for example, modern 
analyses show that the key to moving up the value chain is to shift from simple assembly 
toward design and ultimately production of own label products.
17 Limitations on the 
sourcing of materials will be a constraint rather than a stimulus to higher value-added 
activities. 
    
Thus, it is more than likely that the imposition of restrictive rules of origin rather than 
stimulating economic development raises costs of production by constraining access to 
cheap inputs and undermines the ability of firms to compete in overseas markets. It is 
also no coincidence that restrictive rules of origin act to protect U.S. clothing producers 
and stimulate demand for U.S. made fabrics. It is perhaps ironic that whilst technical 
assistance and advice to many of the countries in the region is stressing the importance of 
access to low cost imported inputs and the need to remove logistical and bureaucratic 
barriers for competitiveness and growth of exports, the rules of origin that will be 
                                                 
17 See Mattila (2003), for example.   27
imposed under AGOA on clothing products in 2004 will act in exactly the opposite way. 
They will constrain access to low-cost imported inputs and will raise bureaucratic barriers 
to exports. A far better approach in stimulating the textile industry in Sub-Saharan Africa 
would be for the US to offer genuine preferences on all textile exports from these 
countries.  
 
The low utilization of clothing preferences by Mauritius and South Africa, the two 
countries which are currently subject to the more restrictive rules of origin is suggestive 
of the dampening effect of these rules on trade. Stevens and Kennan (2003) argue that 
whilst South Africa has the most developed textile industry in the region ‘its clothing 
sector cannot afford to use “originating cloth” without making its products 
uncompetitive’. Hence, the planned imposition of restrictive rules of origin on all AGOA 
beneficiaries in August 2004 is likely to have substantial negative impact on the flow of 
clothing products from Africa to the US.  
 
This is particularly important when bearing in mind that the removal of quotas from 
Asian exporters at the end of 2004 will lead to a much more competitive global market 
for textiles and clothing products. Forcing African suppliers to source fabrics from more 
expensive regional or US sources will handicap firms in these countries as they attempt to 
compete in the US market with products from China and other currently restricted 
suppliers in Asia.   
 
9. Conclusions and Recommendations 
AGOA has yet to have a significant economic impact on one constituent group of 
countries – LDCs not eligible for clothing benefits. In 2002 no exports from these 
countries entered the United States under AGOA. For these countries AGOA will be of 
value if in the future it provides for the export of a greater range of products.  A key issue 
is access to preferences on clothing. It is clear that AGOA preferences on clothing are the 
main source of gains under AGOA and have been a stimulus to export diversification for 
a small but increasing group of countries. Export diversification is a major factor 
underlying the ability of trade to contribute to growth and poverty reduction in these 
countries.    28
 
The special rule of origin that governs exports of these products from most beneficiaries 
is also important in this regard and its planned removal in 2004 will reduce the benefits 
currently being reaped by some countries and undermine the prospects for trade 
diversification by those countries that are currently, or will be in the future, seeking 
preferences on clothing. With these conclusions in mind we derive the following 
recommendations: 
 
1.  To entrench and enhance its benefits, AGOA should be extended over a much 
longer period
18, if not made permanent. For many sectors it is likely that the current 
temporary and relatively short statutory period of AGOA constrains a significant 
investment response.    
 
2.  It is crucial that the liberal rules of origin for clothing products are not replaced, 
as planned, by restrictive rules in 2004. The liberal rules of origin have stimulated and 
facilitated trade in clothing; their removal will substantially reduce the value of AGOA 
preferences for many of the beneficiaries. Further, there is a range of countries that have 
only recently been granted access to clothing preferences and the application of strict 
rules of origin requiring sourcing of fabrics from the region or from the United States will 
severely hinder the ability of clothing producers in these countries to penetrate the U.S. 
market and will reduce the value of AGOA to these countries. There is also a group of 
countries that in the future could be granted clothing preferences, the attractiveness and 
benefits of which will be undermined with restrictive rules of origin. It is important that 
after the removal of quotas on textile and clothing products from Asian countries at the 
end of 2004 that African producers are not handcuffed in the new competitive conditions 
by restrictive rules of origin.  
 
3.  Countries not currently eligible should act to be granted access to preferences on 
clothing products. Preferences on clothing products, with liberal rules of origin, are a 
                                                 
18 The Commission on Capital Flows to Africa (2003) has recommended that AGOA be extended to 2018 
and that the liberal rules of origin also be extended until this date.   29
key source of benefits under AGOA. Those countries that have not yet been granted 
preferences on clothing should seek to upgrade customs procedures so as to satisfy 
AGOA requirements. Assistance from international institutions maybe of relevance. It is 
interesting to note that while exports of clothing to the United States from AGOA 
beneficiaries eligible for clothing benefits under the liberal rules of origin increased by 
176 percent between 1999 and 2002, exports of clothing from AGOA beneficiaries not 
eligible for clothing preferences fell by almost 30 percent. Exports from countries with 
clothing preferences but more restrictive rules of origin increased by just over 30 percent. 
Thus, it is possible that the differential market access conditions under AGOA, including 
the nature of the rules of origin, may have contributed to the negative trend in exports 
from certain AGOA beneficiaries. This is perhaps an issue that warrants additional more 
detailed research.  
 
4.  AGOA should be enhanced by the removal of duties and quotas on all products. 
Extending preferences to excluded, high-duty, agricultural products and to industrial 
sectors such as textiles would offer greater scope for export diversification in beneficiary 
countries. Products that are subject to tariff quotas should be fully liberalized. While tariff 
quotas and the threat of safeguards remain, there is unlikely to be any significant 
investment in these sectors in AGOA beneficiaries and the value of the preferences on in-
quota quantities will remain negligible.  
 
5.  Beneficiaries must address domestic constraints on investment and trade and 
incorporate actions relating to AGOA into a broad strategy for multilateral export 
diversification and expansion. While the changes proposed above would considerably 
enhance the opportunities offered by AGOA, they would not guarantee increases in 
exports or significant economic benefits. For example, there are some countries that are 
eligible for clothing benefits but do not yet export any clothing products to the United 
States. A conducive environment for investment and exports is crucial. Foreign direct 
investment can play an important role, at least in the initial stages of the development 
response, since foreign companies tend to have established  marketing links to the U.S. 
market and bring strong technical and managerial capacities.    30
 
The analysis in this paper tends to reinforce the view of those who advocate the 
importance of multilateral trade liberalization through the WTO. For most African 
countries, while U.S. preferences can provide a stimulus to an initial export expansion of 
specific sectors, the overall benefits of preferential access are rather small and it is likely 
that for most countries the gains from multilateral liberalization will exceed any losses 
from preference erosion. Nevertheless, a small number of countries may be particularly 
affected by the erosion of existing preferences. However, this is not a reason to derail the 
multilateral process and any such difficulties are best addressed in the context of the 
overall development programs of the countries concerned with appropriate assistance 
from the multilateral institutions. Thus, identifying more carefully those who will be 
significantly affected by preference erosion is an important task for further research. 
     
In this light, AGOA preferences are not a panacea for success but rather should be seen as 
one element in the development of a strategy for export led growth and development. It is 
likely that in many AGOA beneficiaries the additional costs of operating relative to other 
locations compromise the margins of preference under AGOA. Only when customs 
clearance procedures are improved, costs of transport and other trade related services are 
reduced and corruption and other disincentives toward investment are removed will the 
full potential of preferential access to the United States under AGOA be realized. 
Addressing these issues now will allow for export growth to be broadly based and will 
provide a climate to ensure that as preferences decline with multilateral liberalization, an 
economic structure for continued export expansion is in place.  
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Appendix Table 1: The Importance of the U.S. as an Export Destination and Recent Evolution of 
Exports for AGOA Beneficiaries and other LDCs 
   Total Exports 
($ Mill) 2002 
Exports to 
US ($ Mill) 
2002 






Exports to US 
1999-2002 
AGOA without Clothing  
Benin   237.3  0.7  0.3%  -1.9%  -96.2% 
Central African Republic   199.2  2.0  1.0%  -18.8%  -30.8% 
Chad   77.2  5.7  7.4%  -28.2%  -17.5% 
Congo, Dem. Rep.   1553.7  189.7  12.2%  29.3%  -18.2% 
Congo, Republic of   2446.5  223.8  9.1%  32.3%  -45.5% 
Cote d'Ivoire   4941.0  381.9  7.7%  5.5%  11.2% 
Djibouti   184.6  1.9  1.0%  11.7%  1638.8% 
Eritrea   ..  0.4  …  …  -23.1% 
Gabon   3280.3  1622.0  49.4%  -6.0%  7.2% 
Gambia, The   31.8  0.6  1.8%  -67.3%  202.4% 
Guinea   856.6  71.6  8.4%  2.5%  -38.0% 
Guinea-Bissau   128.5  0.0  0.0%  104.1%  -51.5% 
Mali   181.7  2.6  1.4%  -32.9%  -70.9% 
Mauritania   583.5  0.9  0.2%  2.2%  23.2% 
Niger   152.7  0.9  0.6%  -58.3%  -81.5% 
Nigeria   19170.8  5819.6  30.4%  32.6%  39.5% 
Rwanda   147.2  3.1  2.1%  171.1%  -16.3% 
Sao Tome and Principe   10.3  0.4  3.8%  -25.0%  -85.5% 
Seychelles   326.1  26.3  8.1%  117.0%  405.8% 
Sierra Leone   105.2  3.8  3.6%  1.6%  -62.9% 
Total Group   34614.3  8357.9  24.1%  19.5%  22.0% 
Total Non-Oil  12163.2  916.3  7.5%  10.4%  -21.4% 
AGOA plus Clothing with Liberal Rules of Origin  
Botswana   1749.9  29.7  1.7%  195.5%  75.5% 
Cameroon   2209.4  172.1  7.8%  5.6%  124.7% 
Cape Verde   23.0  1.8  7.9%  8.8%  2295.2% 
Ethiopia   538.6  25.7  4.8%  14.1%  -15.1% 
Ghana   1665.5  115.6  6.9%  -8.0%  -44.8% 
Kenya   2467.3  189.2  7.7%  12.8%  78.2% 
Lesotho   357.3  321.5  90.0%  162.0%  190.1% 
Madagascar   895.5  215.9  24.1%  16.1%  169.2% 
Malawi   437.1  68.1  15.6%  -17.3%  16.2% 
Mozambique   869.4  8.2  0.9%  225.2%  -20.7% 
Namibia   801.2  57.4  7.2%  13.0%  91.3% 
Senegal   985.1  3.8  0.4%  20.0%  -78.3% 
Swaziland   458.0  114.5  25.0%  54.7%  202.4% 
Tanzania   832.4  25.3  3.0%  19.7%  -26.5% 
Uganda   373.4  15.2  4.1%  -11.7%  -25.0% 
Zambia   699.2  7.8  1.1%  -21.6%  -79.4% 
Total Group   15362.3  1371.7  8.9%  20.8%  56.4%   33
Appendix Table 1: The Importance of the US as an Export Destination and Recent Evolution of 
Exports for AGOA Beneficiaries and other LDCs (Cont.) 










Exports to US 
1999-2002 
AGOA with Clothing but Restrictive Rules of Origin  
Mauritius   1850.7  280.4  15.2%  -1.0%  8.6% 
South Africa   33018.9  4236.0  12.8%  11.8%  32.7% 
Total Group   34869.7  4516.4  13.0%  11.1%  30.9% 
US GSP LDC 
Angola   7949.4  3231.3  40.6%  64.5%  37.6% 
Bangladesh   6333.3  2133.7  33.7%  22.7%  11.0% 
Bhutan   ..  0.8  …  …  94.5% 
Burkina Faso   156.5  2.9  1.9%  -7.9%  5.2% 
Burundi   33.9  0.7  2.0%  -51.3%  -90.2% 
Cambodia   1918.1  1070.7  55.8%  50.0%  80.8% 
Comoros   30.3  5.3  17.5%  147.2%  158.8% 
Equatorial Guinea   1959.1  572.6  29.2%  184.6%  1310.4% 
Haiti   313.6  254.6  81.2%  -9.9%  -15.4% 
Kiribati   37.3  1.1  3.0%  272.4%  -21.9% 
Nepal   587.1  152.4  26.0%  0.8%  -14.2% 
Samoa   73.4  6.4  8.7%  9.3%  20.1% 
Somalia   102.8  0.3  0.3%  -19.2%  81.3% 
Togo   354.7  2.7  0.7%  10.3%  -16.1% 
Vanuatu   90.1  2.8  3.1%  21.2%  40.0% 
Yemen, Republic of   2974.5  226.7  7.6%  31.8%  1449.4% 
Total Group   22914.2  7665.0  33.5%  43.2%  41.4% 
Total Non-Oil  14964.8  4433.7  29.6%  34.0%  44.3% 
UN LDC  
Afghanistan, Islamic 
Republic of   113.7  13.8  12.2%  -15.5%  49.1% 
Lao P. D. Rep.   384.4  2.5  0.6%  -10.6%  -80.6% 
Liberia   1145.1  45.8  4.0%  88.1%  50.1% 
Maldives   235.7  114.0  48.4%  60.6%  107.6% 
Myanmar   2657.0  355.9  13.4%  99.9%  53.6% 
Solomon Islands   91.9  0.5  0.6%  -45.6%  -36.8% 
Sudan   2077.5  1.4  0.1%  168.1%  2258.8% 
Total Group   6705.4  533.8  8.0%  86.6%  57.0% 
          
Note:          
1/ IMF Direction of Trade Mirror data          
2/ USITC dataweb Mirror data          
* Country is grouped by 2002 AGOA status.  Thus, some countries may be different from their current 
AGOA status.     34  35
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